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Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China 
    
Abstract 
 
This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to 
participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. In line with theoretical literature, 
ownership concentration of the borrowing firm is assumed to influence information asymmetries in 
the relationship between the borrower and the lender. We analyze how ownership concentration in-
fluences the participation of foreign banks in a loan syndicate using a sample of syndicated loans 
granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004-2009 for which we have information on ownership 
concentration. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not po-
sitively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. Additional estimations using 
alternative specifications provide similar results. As foreign banks do not react positively to owner-
ship concentration, we conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks 
relative to local banks in China. Moreover, it appears that increased financial leverage discourages 
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, vaikuttaako asymmetrinen informaatio ulkomaisten pankkien haluk-
kuuteen osallistua syndikoituun lainanantoon Kiinassa oleville yrityksille. Teoreettisen kirjallisuu-
den mukaan omistuksen keskittymisen aste lainaa ottavassa yrityksessä vaikuttaa asymmetriseen 
informaatioon lainanottajan ja lainanantajan välillä. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, miten omistuksen 
keskittyminen vaikuttaa ulkomaisten pankkien osallistumiseen lainasyndikaattiin. Työssä käytetään 
aineistoa,  joka  on  vuosina  2004–2009  kiinalaisille  yrityksille  myönnettyjä  syndikoituja  lainoja. 
Tältä  ajanjaksolta  tietoa  omistuksen  keskittymisestä  on  olemassa.  Tulosten  mukaan  omistuksen 
keskittyminen lainaa ottavassa yrityksessä ei vaikuta positiivisesti ulkomaisten pankkien osallis-
tumiseen lainasyndikaattiin. Estimoinneista vaihtoehtoisilla spesifikaatioilla saadaan samankaltaisia 
tuloksia.  Koska  ulkomaiset  pankit  eivät  reagoi  positiivisesti  omistuksen  keskittymiseen,  asym-
metrinen informaatio ei vaikuta olevan erityisen ongelmallista Kiinassa oleville ulkomaisille pan-
keille  verrattuna  kotimaisiin  pankkeihin.  Runsaampi  lainanotto  vähentää  ulkomaisten  pankkien 
osallistumista syndikoituihin  lainoihin, ja ne näyttävät  siten olevan varovaisempia riskienhallin-
nassa kuin kotimaiset pankit. 
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1  Introduction  
 
The last three decades have witnessed impressive growth in China, yet the prevailing   view persists 
that the Chinese financial system is that it suffers from serious problems that could hamper future 
economic  growth.  The  Chinese financial system,  as  noted by  Allen et  al. (2009), “is  currently 
dominated by a large, but under-developed, banking system.” Specifically, this inefficient banking 
industry plays an oversized role relative to the financial markets in financing the economy. This is 
particularly true of the major state-owned banks (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 
2009), and as a result, private-sector borrowers often find themselves at the back of the line when 
seeking access to credit.
1 Moreover, despite the huge decline in nonperforming loan (NPL) ratios 
over the last decade,
2 recent credit growth has renewed fears of an uptick in NPL ratios in the bank-
ing industry (OECD, 2010). 
These problems are due in part to the state’s strong presence in the banking industry. State 
involvement in management of Chinese banks, in turn, leads to other problems such as toleration of 
overstaffing
3 or lending decisions that are guided more  by public policy than commercial criteria 
(Podpiera, 2006).
4 
One can imagine a number of ways the presence of foreign banks in the Chinese financial 
system might help alleviate this situation. Greater foreign bank lending might enhance bank credit 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Foreign banks might also be more averse to making bad loans 
as they are not pursuing public policy goals and lack the non-economic motivations of state policy-
makers when allocating credit. The establishment of foreign banks in China could also conceivably 
enhance banking sector performance overall as it has been shown that foreign banks are more effi-
cient than local banks (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009) and can enhance profitability in the Chinese 
banking sector (e.g. Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2008). 
                                                 
1 While China’s total bank credit ratios are high (between 100% and 120% of GDP over the past decade) Allen et al. 
(2009) observe that the size of Chinese banking industry in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors amounted to 
just 31% of GDP in 2005. This is considerably less than average of 78% of GDP in the group of countries analyzed in 
La Porta et al. (1998), but well in line with the share found in major emerging economies (32% of GDP). 
2 Nonperforming loans (NPLs) equaled about 7.3% of GDP in China in 2005. This is far less than the 22.5% NPL ratio 
of 2000, but considerably higher than the 0.7% NPL ratio in the US in 2005 (Allen et al., 2009). According to China’s 
Banking Regulatory Commission, total outstanding NPLs in the country’s banking sector (including policy banks, loan 
companies and postal savings banks) in 2009 amounted to 1.5334 trillion yuan, or about 4.5% of GDP. 
3 Matthews, Xiao and Zhang (2009) describe overstaffing in Chinese banks and show how it leads to cost inefficiency. 
4 In his study on Chinese bank lending, Podpiera (2006) concludes that “banks do not appear to take enterprise profit-
ability into account when making lending decisions.” Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski  
and Laurent Weill 
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In principle, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 opened the Chinese banking system up 
to foreign investors in two ways. First, it meant foreign banks would be allowed to operate directly 
through the branches and subsidiaries they themselves established. This expansion was to be facili-
tated during a five-year transition period in line with China’s WTO commitments. Second, foreign 
strategic participation in domestic banks was allowed in 2003. The foreign strategic investment 
rules issued by China’s Banking Regulatory Commission, however, continue to limit the participa-
tion of foreign banks in local banks to a minority stake. The reality today is that the overall market 
share of foreign banks in China’s banking sector remains quite low (OECD, 2010).
5  
Even if direct lending is difficult, foreign banks can grant credit to Chinese companies via 
the syndicated loan market. Here, foreign banks play a major role. As in other emerging economies 
in Asia, China’s manager league tables in the syndicated loans market were initially foreign domi-
nated and a substantial proportion of loans were issued in foreign currency. Since the global finan-
cial crisis and collapse of the market, this tendency (at least temporarily) has been reversed (Chui et 
al., 2010). With the market rebound, the China Banking Association reports that foreign banks ac-
counted for 7.11% of the volume of loans to companies in 2009. 
The key determinant for foreign banks in the financing of the Chinese economy, however, 
may be the degree of information asymmetries in the bank-borrower relationship relative to local 
banks. This is a major issue in assessing the prospects for expansion of foreign bank lending in 
China. At first glance, it would appear local banks have the information advantage. They have eas-
ier access to local firm-specific information and likely benefit from a better understanding of the 
local accounting documents. On the other hand, foreign banks may have informational advantages 
or at least can get more out of information if they can acquire it from local banks as they have supe-
rior skills in monitoring and risk analysis of loans. Indeed, it has been shown that foreign banks op-
erating in emerging economies often leverage their efficiency advantages based on their superior 
expertise and technology (for China, see e.g. Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; for European transi-
tion countries, see e.g. Weill, 2003, or Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005). 
This paper investigates borrower-lender information asymmetries by focusing on the syn-
dicated loan market in China. Numerous researchers have noted that syndicated loans provide a 
relevant laboratory for analyzing information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders as they 
can influence the syndicate structure (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Bosch and Steffen, 
2010). Our goal here is to see whether information asymmetries increase or reduce participation of 
foreign banks in syndicated loans. If foreign banks suffer from informational disadvantage relative 
                                                 
5 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010) estimated the market share of foreign banks in May 2010 at 2%.  
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to local banks, we would expect them to base their lending decisions on characteristics of borrowing 
firms known to minimize agency risks. Syndicated loans granted to firms with greater information 
asymmetries would thus be expected to have a lower proportion of foreign banks in the pool of par-
ticipant banks. 
We  start  by  considering  ownership  concentration  as  a  signal  used  by  foreign  banks. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that ownership structure can be used as a signal to solve an in-
formation asymmetry problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that agency costs can arise from 
conflicts of interest between categories of agents inside the firm. When control is distinguished 
from ownership in the firm, the manager can use private information to extract private benefits at 
the expense of other stakeholders.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out that ownership concentration can exert an impact on 
this moral hazard behavior of the manager through his incentives for effort. In a concentrated own-
ership structure, the top shareholder has  strong financial incentive to control manager behavior. 
Concentration reduces the public good problem associated with monitoring of the manager. From 
the creditor’s perspective, ownership concentration reduces the possibilities that managers divert 
resources or diminish their efforts. 
Bebchuk (1999) suggests the benefits of ownership concentration might actually be greater 
in countries with weak investor protection. Where legal protection is weak, he argues, managers 
have greater opportunities to redirect resources. As such, a shareholder has greater incentive to take 
a large controlling stake in the firm to put pressure on managers. As China is characterized by a 
poor protection of investors (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005), this would increase the expectation that 
ownership concentration would reduce agency costs compared to countries with better legal protec-
tion. 
Our hypothesis is that foreign banks will be more attentive to the ownership structures of 
Chinese borrowing firms than other banks when they face greater information asymmetries. Indeed, 
if a particular ownership structure helps minimize agency costs, we would expect it to be favored by 
foreign investors as it provides a positive signal that reduces their informational disadvantage. 
Our empirical investigation analyzes whether ownership concentration of firms using syn-
dicated loans influence the fraction of foreign banks in the participant banks of the syndicate in 
China. Ownership concentration is taken into account through two variables in line with former lit-
erature: the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, and the Herfindahl index of the 
percentages of shares held by all shareholders. Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski  
and Laurent Weill 
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This study contributes to the understanding of foreign bank lending in China. We also 
broaden the expanding body of research on syndicated loans as this work is the first to the best of 
our knowledge which investigates issues related to syndicated loans in China. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related literature. 
Section 3 describes data and variables, and section 4 shows our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Related literature 
 
As with literature on syndicated loans generally, study of the impacts of information asymmetries 
on syndicate structure has expanded rapidly in recent years. 
The seminal paper of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) analyzes the factors influencing the 
proportion of a loan sold by the arranger on a sample of US loans. They observe that a larger share 
of a loan can be sold by the arranger when the information on the borrower is more transparent (i.e. 
the borrower is a listed company or has a debt rating). 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) extend the discussion by investigating the determinants of two 
variables for syndicate structure: the number of banks in the syndicate, and the concentration of 
banks’ retained share of the loan in the syndicate measured by the Herfindahl index. Again using a 
sample of US syndicated loans, they find that the better information on the borrower (stock market 
listing or debt rating), the less concentrated the syndicate. 
Sufi (2007) explicitly investigates whether information asymmetries influence syndicate 
structure in the US. Information asymmetries are proxied through an opacity variable defined as a 
borrower that is privately held and unrated. Syndicate structure is considered in three dimensions: 
number of participants, number of arrangers, and the percentage of the loan retained by the lead ar-
ranger. He provides support to the view that information asymmetries influence syndicate structure 
by substantially increasing the size of the syndicate. 
Extending this strand, Bosch and Steffen (2010) examine the potential role of credit ratings 
and stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetries on the structure of syndicated 
loans in the UK. Their variables for syndicate structure are the number of lenders and the number of 
foreign lenders. They provide compelling evidence that foreign banks are reluctant to participate in 
syndicated loans to unrated borrowers. 
Looking at syndicated loans in both developed and emerging economies, Aslan and Kumar 
(2009) confirm that banks use attributes of ownership structure in their screening processes. More  
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precisely, they show that an increase in the ownership concentration of the top shareholder tends to 
diminish the loan price, increase the loan maturity, and reduce the number of lenders in the syndi-
cate.
6 Their results are in line with the view that borrower agency risk has an impact on syndicate 
structure. They also show that ownership structure can play a greater role on loan characteristics 
and syndicate structure in Asian emerging markets than in developed markets due to greater prevail-
ing agency risks in such Asian countries. 
To our knowledge, Lee et al. (2010) offer the first paper examining the role of information 
asymmetries on syndicate structure in an Asian country (Japan). They investigate how borrower 
characteristics affect syndicate structure, considered as the total number of banks participating in a 
syndicate for a sample of Japanese syndicated loans. They give special care to variable s related to 
financial distress such as leverage and Altman’s Z-score, and find that the size of the syndicate is 
smaller when borrowers are more prone to financial distress or bigger in size. 
In summary, literature supports the view that information asymmetries influence syndicate 
structure. This accords with our hypothesis that information asymmetries can influence the partici-
pation of foreign banks in the syndicate. Our study differs, however, from the literature in two re-
spects. First, we focus on participation of foreign banks, a widely neglected topic with the notable 
exception of Bosch and Steffen (2010). Second, we analyze the syndicated loan market in the con-
text of a major emerging economy (China). 
 
 
3  Data and variables 
 
3.1  Data 
 
Our data on syndicated loans, borrowers, and banks are taken from Bloomberg. Ownership-related 
data are supplemented from other data sources, including company websites and annual reports. 
Our initial requirement for data on financial characteristics and ownership structure of borrowing 
firms considerably reduces the size of our initial sample. Following Qian and Strahan (2007) and 
Ivashina (2009), our sample shrinks further as we omit loans to financial companies on the view 
that the financing needs of such companies are different than those of non-financial companies. 
Thus, starting from an initial sample of 427 facilities for the period from 1999 to 2009, our sample 
                                                 
6 Their study also looks at the impact of deviation of control to cash flow rights of the principal shareholder on loan 
characteristics and syndicate structure. Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski  
and Laurent Weill 
Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries 
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based on information availability and limitation to non-financial borrowers reduces to 92 syndicated 
loans in the period 2004-2009. 
Some 372 banks were involved in the syndicated loans in our final sample. As banks in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan experienced a different development path in recent decades than mainland 
Chinese banks, we treat them as foreign. The sample of participant banks includes 79 Chinese 
banks (21%), and 293 foreign banks (79%). Among foreign banks, 56 are incorporated in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan (i.e. 24% of foreign banks). 
 
3.2  Variables 
 
We focus on the potential impact of the ownership concentration of borrowing firms on the pres-
ence of foreign banks in syndicated loans. The explained variable in our regressions is the fraction 
of foreign bank lenders in the syndicate, computed as the ratio of the number of foreign banks in the 
syndicate to the total number of lenders (Fraction of Foreign Banks). 
Our crucial explanatory variables concern ownership concentration. In line with earlier 
studies on China (Xu and Wang, 1999; Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010), we use two alternative variables: 
the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (Top Shareholder),
7 and the Herfindahl in-
dex of the percentages of shares held by the shareholders (HHI Concentration).
8 
We control for state ownership as this type of ownership can exert an influence on the pro-
pensity of foreign banks to participate in the syndicate. On the one hand, the potential collusion be-
tween Chinese banks and borrowers may be more likely if the main shareholder is owned by the 
state, as the Chinese state owns a majority of shares in the largest Chinese banks. On the other hand, 
foreign banks may prefer to lend money to state -owned firms for safety reasons. In this case, they 
may perceive the default risk of such borrowers as lower than that of privately-held firms and con-
sequently, as they may care more for the performance of the loan, they would positively value this 
type of ownership. We test the role of state ownership with the variable  Top State which is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the main shareholder is the State or a state-owned company. 
We also test the potential influence of characteristics of the borrowing firm and the loan. 
The selection of these characteristics is based on earlier papers on syndicate structure (Bosch and 
Steffen, 2010; Lee et al., 2010). 
                                                 
7 Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) also measure ownership concentration with the percentage of shares held by the largest bor-
rower in their analysis of the link between ownership concentration and stock price synchronicity for Chinese listed 
firms. 
8 Xu and Wang (1999) use the Herfindahl index of the percentages of shares held by the shareholders, next to the pr o-
portion of shares held by the top ten shareholders to measure ownership concentration.  
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In line with the existing literature on  syndicated loans, we include five variables for the 
firm characteristics.
9 Profitability is accounted for by return on assets (ROA). We expect a positive 
coefficient for this variable as foreign banks are expected to care more for the performance of bor-
rowing firms than local banks constrained by official objectives in their lending decisions. Term 
structure of liabilities is taken into account with the ratio of short-term debt to total debt (Short 
Term Debt) and the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage). Two opposite effects can be sug-
gested for these debt variables. A higher value for either of these variables suggests a greater likeli-
hood of financial distress. However, a greater share of short-term debt in total debt may force man-
agers  to  employ  prudent  management  practices  in  order  to  regularly  repay  debt.  This  reduces 
agency costs and is positively valued by foreign banks. In a similar vein, greater leverage can raise 
the pressure of managers to perform as it reduces “free cash-flow” at the disposal of managers (Jen-
sen, 1986) as it implies interest payment obligations that must be satisfied. 
We also consider tangibility of assets with the ratio of tangible assets to total assets (Tan-
gibility). This is commonly used as a proxy for collateral value. We expect a positive coefficient for 
this variable as it indicates a greater liquidation value in the event of default (even if this effect may 
be lowered by the weak protection of creditors in China). The market-value to book-value ratio 
(Market to Book) is also considered to gauge the growth potential of the borrowing firm (Smith and 
Watts, 1992). It is expected to favor the presence of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. 
Data limitations restrict us to two variables for loan characteristics: the amount (Loan Size) 
and the maturity of the loan facility (Maturity). We expect both variables to be negatively associ-
ated with the presence of foreign banks as both are associated with increased risk. 
We include several dummy variables for borrowers having multiple loans in the sample. 
We also include dummy variables for the industry according to the industry classification in the 
Bloomberg database  and for the year to control for yearly effects. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables. The fraction of foreign bank lenders in 
the syndicate on average is 65%.This is in line with the fact that the syndicated loan market is glob-
alized (see Carey and Nini, 2007) and with former evidence on emerging markets.
10 Interestingly, 
                                                 
9 We do not control for size in these estimations as correlation of this variable with the Government variable was too 
strong. The fact that we take into account the amount of the loan allows us to control at least partly for the impact of 
borrower size. 
10 In the case of Russia, Fungacova, Godlewski and Weill (2011) show that the vast majority of syndicated loans 
granted to companies does not include a single Russian bank among the syndicate participants. Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski  
and Laurent Weill 
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dispersion is high with a standard deviation of 37%, which results from the fact that foreign banks 
use to be either almost the unique participants of the syndicate or to be almost absent. 
Ownership concentration appears to be high for borrowing firms. The mean percentage of 
shares held by the top shareholder is equal to 48%, while the mean Herfindahl index for ownership 
concentration is 31%. It accords with the theoretical prediction from Bebchuk (1999), who, as men-
tioned earlier, argues that weaker investor protection favors concentrated ownership structure. 
The analysis of financial characteristics of borrowing firms tends to show that Chinese bor-
rowers on the syndicated loan market have a satisfactory financial situation. Their indebtedness is 
limited with a mean leverage of 35.9%, while their profitability is rather high with a mean ROA of 
6.1% and the tangibility of assets is strong (53%). 
The average loan size is $1.4 billion with an average maturity close to seven years. Do 
syndicated loans in China differ from the rest of the world? Carey and Nini (2007) point out that the 
mean loan size is $370 million in the US and $340 million in Europe, whereas the median maturity 
is 48 months in the US and 60 months in Europe. Godlewski and Weill (2008) observe that syndi-
cated loans in emerging markets have a mean amount of $218 million and a mean maturity of 54 
months. In this respect, syndicated loans to Chinese firms are much larger and have longer maturi-
ties than those granted to other firms. 
It is fair to ask whether our sample of syndicated loans is representative of the syndicated 
loan market in China as our data requirements on borrower characteristics lead us to reduce the full 
sample of loans from 428 to 92. In response, we compare the loan characteristics of the full sample 
with our final sample. The mean maturity and the mean loan amount are respectively 7.67 years and 
$3.04 billion for the full sample compared to 7.30 years and $1.4 billion for the final sample used in 
the estimations. Thus, the syndicated loans of our sample have approximately the same maturity but 
are somewhat smaller (even if the order of magnitude of loan amounts is comparable). Our final 








BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/ 2010 
 
 
  13 
4  Results 
 
This section displays our results. We present the main estimations and some additional tests. 
 
4.1  Main estimations 
 
We perform regressions of the fraction of foreign bank lenders in the syndicate on a set of variables 
including ownership concentration and control variables. Table 2 displays the results. We present 
two estimations differing with the tested measure for ownership concentration (Top Shareholder or 
HHI Concentration). We observe that Top Shareholder is not significant, whereas HHI Concentra-
tion is significantly negative. Consequently, we provide evidence that greater ownership concentra-
tion does not enhance the willingness of foreign banks to participate in the loan syndicate. As for-
eign banks consider ownership concentration as a positive signal, we find no support for the view 
that they suffer from greater information asymmetries than local banks. Indeed, our results tend to 
suggest the opposite. 
How does one interpret this finding? We suggest two complementary explanations. The 
first is based on the behavior of foreign banks and the other deals with the behavior of local banks 
in China. On the one hand, foreign banks may not suffer from an informational disadvantage and 
may even have informational advantages as they benefit from superior skills in loan monitoring and 
risk analysis. This line of reasoning is supported by empirical evidence. For example, when com-
paring efficiency of banks in China, Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) show that the majority of for-
eign banks are more efficient than local banks and that minority foreign ownership contributes to 
enhanced efficiency of Chinese banks. The authors attribute these results to the fact that foreign 
banks possess superior risk management skills. 
On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that local banks are reluctant to get in-
volved in syndicated loans (Caijing Magazine, 2009), suggesting they are at a disadvantage in risk 
monitoring. As a consequence, local banks may be more sensitive to the degree of information 
asymmetries and more prone to participate in a syndicated loan when information asymmetries are 
lower. 
The Top State variable is not significant, meaning that the presence of the state as the larg-
est shareholder does not influence the willingness of foreign banks to participate in a syndicate. We 
now turn to the analysis of the other determinants of the presence of foreign banks in loan syndi-Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski  
and Laurent Weill 
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cates. Only one borrower characteristic is significant: Leverage. We observe that this variable is 
negatively linked to the fraction of foreign banks involved in the loan syndicate. This finding can be 
explained by the fact that higher leverage is associated with a greater likelihood of financial dis-
tress. This result is in line with literature on the lending behavior of Chinese domestic banks that are 
driven by political considerations rather than financial ones. As foreign banks are more likely to 
care about the repayment chances of the loan than local banks, their participation in loan syndicates 
is reduced in the presence of increased leverage. 
When investigating loan characteristics, we observe a negative coefficient for Loan Size 
and Maturity that is significant in most cases. This means that larger loans and loans with longer 
maturities are associated with a lower presence of foreign banks in the syndicate. This finding ac-
cords with the fact that such loans are perceived as riskier. All other tested variables are not signifi-
cant in the estimations. 
In summary, it appears from our results that ownership concentration does not favor the 
participation  of  foreign  banks  in  loan  syndicates.  This  defies  the  view  that  foreign  banks  face 
greater information asymmetries than local banks. Furthermore, we find that foreign banks partici-
pate more in loan syndicates to borrowing firms with lower leverage and that they prefer to partici-
pate to syndicated loans for smaller amounts and shorter maturities. In a nutshell, foreign banks do 
not suffer from greater information asymmetries than local banks and are sensitive to factors that 
increase default risk. 
To determine whether these results have been influenced by our methodological choices, 
we perform a few robustness tests. 
 
4.2  Robustness checks 
 
We check the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we consider the fraction of foreign 
banks among arrangers rather than among participant banks in the syndicate. The literature supports 
the view that information asymmetries can exist between arrangers and other participants in the 
syndicate (e.g. Ivashina, 2009). By focusing on the arrangers, we exclude the potential effects of 
information asymmetries between arrangers and other participants in the syndicate. The dependent 
variable is here the Fraction of Foreign Arrangers defined as the number of foreign banks as ar-
rangers in the syndicate divided by the total number of arrangers. Table 3 displays the results. We 
observe in all estimations that greater ownership concentration significantly reduces the fraction of 
foreign arrangers in the syndicate. Hence, these results corroborate those obtained with the fraction  
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of foreign banks among participant banks in the syndicate, i.e. greater ownership concentration does 
not favor the participation of foreign banks in loan syndicates. We even observe a significantly 
negative relationship for both concentration measures. In other words, information asymmetries ap-
pear to play a stronger role for local banks when participating as arranger in a syndicated loan than 
as a junior bank. This can be explained by the fact that foreign banks have at their disposal better 
skills in the administration of a loan as pointed out by Gadanecz (2004), who observes that local 
banks are usually present as junior banks rather than arrangers in syndicated loans in emerging 
markets. 
Second, we test an alternative definition of foreign banks when considering the fraction of 
foreign banks in the syndicate. We initially treated Hong Kong and Taiwanese banks as foreign in 
recognition of the different economic and institutional evolutionary paths of these financial institu-
tions. Arguably, the information asymmetries here may be weaker owing to the geographic and cul-
tural links of Hong Kong and Taiwanese banks with mainland China than for other foreign banks. 
To test this assumption, we redo our estimations by treating Hong Kong and Taiwan banks as local. 
We display the results in Table 4. The findings are similar to our main results with a significantly 
negative coefficient for ownership concentration measures. 
Third, we check the robustness of our results as to the choice of control variables. To this 
end, we run our estimations again with a different set of control variables. As profitability is taken 
into account through a various set of variables in the empirical studies, we alternatively use the ratio 
of EBITDA to total assets (EBITDA) instead of ROA in the estimations. We also test the inclusion 
of  the  Altman’s  Z-score  (Z-Score)  which  predicts  bankruptcy.  This  variable  provided  by  the 
Bloomberg database is a linear combination of weighted financial ratios (Altman, 1968, 2000). In 
our original model, bankruptcy risk was measured through the Leverage variable as greater leverage 
enhances the likelihood of financial distress. The Z-score is then used as an alternative measure. All 
these new estimations are provided in Table 5. Here again we point out that ownership concentra-
tion still exerts a negative impact on the presence of foreign banks in the syndicate. 
Overall, our main findings survived all these robustness tests. We find evidence that the 
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5  Conclusions 
 
This study analyzed whether foreign banks suffer more than local banks from information asymme-
tries when lending to Chinese corporate borrowers. We consider whether ownership concentration 
of borrowing firms influences the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans, 
and observe no positive link between ownership concentration and participation of foreign banks in 
syndicated loans to Chinese borrowing firms. Instead, the results suggest a negative relationship. As 
ownership concentration can be considered as a signal of reduced agency costs, we interpret this as 
evidence that there is no informational disadvantage facing foreign banks relative to local banks in 
China. We attribute this finding to the superior skills of foreign banks in risk analysis and manage-
ment. This explanation is further supported by the fact that factors associated with greater default 
risk reduce the participation of foreign banks in loan syndicates. We again interpret this as evidence 
that foreign banks are better at risk analysis and management than local banks. 
Our findings are in line with former studies showing the role of information asymmetries 
in the structure of syndicated loans (e.g. Sufi, 2007). However, only the recent paper from Bosch 
and Steffen (2010) investigates the impact of information asymmetries on the participation of for-
eign banks in loan syndicates. They reach the opposite conclusion: that greater information asym-
metries lead to lower foreign bank participation. Significantly, their paper applies to UK syndicated 
loans, while ours investigates syndicated loans in an emerging economy. Our findings suggest for-
eign banks from developed countries may benefit from their superior skills relative to local banks in 
an emerging economy. This explanation accords with the conclusion of the literature devoted to 
comparative efficiency of foreign and local banks: while local banks dominate foreign banks in de-
veloped countries (Berger et al., 2000), the studies show the opposite result in emerging countries 
(e.g. Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005). 
The main normative implication of this result is that greater involvement of foreign banks 
could enhance financial development of China, so measures favoring the participation of foreign 
banks in the Chinese economy should be promoted.  
Finally, in spite of the poor institutional framework in China, we show that foreign banks 
do not face barriers from greater information asymmetries. In other words, the limited participation 
of foreign banks in the financing of the Chinese economy appears to be largely due to legal obsta-
cles imposed by the Chinese state. 
This paper provides a point of departure for further research on syndicated loans in China. 
Deeper analysis of the structure of these facilities would be an excellent first step. .  
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  Description  N  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables         
Fraction of Foreign Banks  Number of foreign banks in the 
syndicate to total number of lend-
ers 
92  0.65  0.37 
Fraction of Foreign Arrangers  Number of foreign arrangers in 
the syndicate to total number of 
arrangers 
89  0.69  0.37 
Firm characteristics         
Top Shareholder  Percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder of the firm 
92  0.48  0.21 
HHI Concentration  Herfindahl index of the percen-
tages of shares held by the share-
holders 
91  0.31  0.23 
Top State  Dummy variable equal to one if 
the largest shareholder is the state 
92  0.62  0.49 
ROA  Profit after tax to total assets  92  6.10  7.68 
Leverage  Total debt to total assets  92  35.87  18.51 
Short Term Debt  Short-term debt to total debt  92  0.49  0.29 
Market to Book Value  Market value of assets to book 
value of assets 
92  1.92  2.07 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization 
divided by total assets 
92  0.11  0.06 
Altman Z-score  Weighted average of financial 
ratios compounded by Bloomberg 
database 
69  3.45  5.55 
Loan characteristics         
Loan Size  Logarithm of the size of the loan 
in USD billion 
92  1.40   3.61 
Maturity  Maturity of loan in years  92  7.30  8.00 
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  Regressions 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 




Top Shareholder  -0.304 
(1.45) 
- 
HHI Concentration  -  -0.382* 
(1.85) 
































Number of observations  92  91 
Adjusted R²  0.45  0.45 
 
Definitions of variables appear in table 1. The dependent variable is Fraction of Foreign Banks. This table reports coefficients 
 with t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy  








BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/ 2010 
 
 
  21 
Table 3 




  Regressions 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 




Top Shareholder  -0.383* 
(1.77) 
- 
HHI Concentration  -  -0.457* 
(2.16) 
































Number of observations  89  89 
Adjusted R²  0.45  0.44 
 
Definitions of variables appear in table 1. The dependent variable is Fraction of Foreign Arrangers. This table reports coefficients 
with t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy  
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Table 4 
Alternative definition of foreign bank 
 
 
  Regressions 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 




Top Shareholder  -0.475** 
(2.01) 
- 
HHI Concentration  -  -0.469** 
(1.99) 
































Number of observations  92  91 
Adjusted R²  0.33  0.31 
 
Definitions of variables appear in table 1. The dependent variable is Fraction of Foreign Banks, but here banks originating from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are treated as local banks. This table reports coefficients with t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote 
an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the re-
gressions, but not reported.  
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Table 5 




  Regressions 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Top Shareholder  -0.306 
(1.43) 
-  -0.473* 
(1.83) 
- 
HHI Concentration  -  -0.395* 
(1.87) 
-  -0.621** 
(2.29) 
















-  - 




-  - 












































Number of observations  92  91  69  69 
Adjusted R²  0.45  0.45  0.49  0.49 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. The dependent variable is Fraction of Foreign Banks. This table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 
5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
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